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Abstract. This study investigated the current developmental state of research on franchise 
systems in Taiwan. A systematic literature review was conducted, in which studies 
published by the Taiwan Social Science Citation Index were used as the primary data and 
studies related to franchise systems were analyzed. The results showed that the most 
common types of research conducted by Taiwanese scholars were quantitative research 
(56.25%), case studies (25.0%), conceptual papers (12.5%), and qualitative research 
(6.25%). Of all the related topics investigated by Taiwanese scholars, entrepreneur traits, 
motivation for joining (or opening) a franchise system; performance; business types; and 
knowledge, technologies, and innovations were the most frequently explored. The most 
common theories examined were agency (22.22%), resource scarcity (16.67%), information 
asymmetry (11.11%), transaction cost (11.11%), intellectual capital(5.56%), resource 
dependence (5.56%), dynamic knowledge creation (5.56%), resource constraint (5.56%), 
social identity (5.56%), risk allocation (5.56%), and communication (5.56%) theories.  
Keywords. Systematic literature review, Taiwanese Social Science Citation Index (TSSCI), 
Franchise system. 
JEL. M10, L33, L52. 
 
1. Introduction 
n 1991, Williamson generalized the key differences between institutional 
economics, contract laws, and organizational theories, and asserted that 
economic organization takes on not only market and hierarchy forms but also 
hybrid forms. Franchise systems can be viewed as a type of hybrid economic 
organization; however, they are also a type of cooperative venture system 
(Gassenheimer, Baucus, & Baucus, 1996; Spinelli & Birley, 1996). Because 
franchisees exhibit entrepreneur-like traits (Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, & 
Backhaus, 2016), franchise systems provide them with a shortcut for gathering 
resources from all participating entrepreneurs, who devote themselves to a 
particular brand to facilitate its growth and make profits (Chiou & Droge, 2015). 
Franchise systems have become a topic of interest for researchers because of their 
uniqueness. In addition, they have grown rapidly over the past 25 years (Stanworth 
& Curran, 1991). A search of SSCI-related journals over the past decade (2005–
2014) showed that 1,054 studies have been published on this topic, and that the 
number of studies published has grown annually, as follows: 54 in 2005, 71 in 
2006, 78 in 2007, 89 in 2008, 114 in 2009, 109 in 2010, 143 in 2011, 116 in 2012, 
123 in 2013, and 157 in 2014, (Web of Science, 2015). These results 
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exemplifiedthe attention that international journals are paying to franchise systems, 
and that many researchershave devoted themselves in studies in this field. 
Franchise systems have become critical hybrid organizations in Taiwan and 
exhibit a majoreffect on its economy (Tsen & Wu, 2011). However, studies on this 
unique governance model remain scant in Taiwan, signifying thatfurther 
investigation is warranted. The author of this study hopes to provoke the interest of 
researchers so that they can work together to tackleconcerns related to franchise 
systems. In this study, relevant concepts were clarified and studies published by the 
Taiwan Social Science Citation Index (TSSCI) were reviewed to gain insight into 
the current state of research on franchise systems. The results and discussion are 
summarized to serve as a reference for future research. 
 
2. Basic Concepts of a Franchise 
A franchise system comprises a franchisor and two or more franchisees, whose 
relationships are clearly defined in a contract and entail working toward a common 
goal. This form of organization has become increasingly common (Michael, 2000). 
Because franchise systems may be viewed as a collection of many small 
businesses, their finances, ownership rights, and control rights have attracted 
researchers’ attention (Hutchinson, 1999). Bound by a contract, franchisors and 
franchisees are in a mutually beneficial relationship in which they are legally 
independent but economically interdependent (Michael, 2000). This form of 
organization differs from that observed traditionally, whereunique governance 
models are adoptedto link small and large companies, enable coexistence 
(Stanworth & Curran, 1991), and facilitate effective resource allocation (Spinelli & 
Birley, 1996). Franchisors are managers and suppliers, whereas franchiseesare 
managees and owners; franchisors and franchisees have a contractual relationship, 
not a partnership, in which clear and formal provisions are in place to regulate the 
matters that both parties must complywith. These matters include ensuring 
consistent product quality; following operating instructions (for franchisees); 
adopting identical, standard production procedures; and using identical logos 
(2000). Franchise system performance is a topic of interest to many researchers (El 
Akremi, Perrigot, & Piot-Lepetit, 2015; Chiou, & Droge, 2015). 
Franchisors and franchisees struggle with information asymmetry. According to 
the “market for lemons” effect proposed by Akerlof (1970), the two parties in a 
trade relationship are generally unable to obtain complete information on the other 
party. This study proposed that franchisors have more internal information than 
franchisees do, and that the asymmetry of information makes it easy for franchisors 
to seek private gains at the cost of franchisees. The fact that the franchisors know 
more information will raise franchisees’ suspicions, accelerating the collapse of the 
franchise system. Therefore, when franchisees join, franchisors and their partners 
(i.e., franchisees) must establish a trust relationship and relationship norms through 
mutual communication. In addition, the two parties must sign a formal and binding 
contract (Gassenheimer, Baucus, & Baucus, 1996), and franchisees must actively 
play the role of supervisors to protect their own interests from being harmed. 
In a franchise system, the franchisor is the owner of the franchise logo and the 
guarantor of franchise product and service quality. A contract is in place to allow 
franchisees to use these rights (Michael, 2000). This signifies a hybrid of 
ownership rights and control rights as well as the presence of double governance 
(i.e., management and ownership governance) (Hutchinson, 1999). Franchisees 
exhibit entrepreneur-like traits and understand that by joining a franchise system 
and enjoying its brand identity, they will experience less difficulty entering the 
market (Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, & Backhaus, 2016). When franchisees join a 
franchise system, a part of them hopes to duplicate the success of the franchise and 
make profits quickly. Therefore, franchise systems with superior performance will 
attract more franchisees. Trust and communication are considered crucial factors in 
a relationship and prerequisites for superior performance and competitive success 
(Eser, 2012). Thus, commitment and trust between franchisors and franchisees are 
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crucial. The management models of transformational or empowering leadership 
can help improve relationships and transaction costs, whichare positively correlated 
with franchise performance (Stanworth & Curran, 1991). Because franchisees must 
give up autonomy and meet franchisors’ governance demands, franchisees must be 
sufficiently compensated (i.e., earn enough profits); if not, the franchise system 
will collapse. Under these premises, the franchise system has become preferred 
among entrepreneurs because of its unique governance model. 
Franchise systems are a type of hybrid governance (Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, 
& Backhaus, 2016) and feature a form of economic organization that ranks 
between the two traditional forms of economic organization (i.e., market and 
hierarchy). Franchise performance is one of the major factors considered by 
franchisees prior to joining franchise systems (El Akremi, Perrigot, & Piot-Lepetit, 
2015; Chiou & Droge, 2015). The presence of sufficient profit incentives will 
induce franchisees to join. Conversely, the absence of sufficient profit incentives 
will cause franchisees to leave. Franchisors, who play the roles of managers and 
suppliers, hope that their franchisees make a profit. However, they also worry that 
the franchisees will opt out of the franchise system and start their own businesses 
when they enjoy great success. Therefore, franchisors enforce strict contract law 
sand restrict knowledge and technologies to retainfranchisees in the system. 
Franchise use their roles as mentors and suppliers as well as core product 
technologies to control franchisees, imposing rules to prevent core knowledge from 
leaking out. Chen & Dimou (2005) indicated that international hotel groups who 
recruit franchisees are exposed to two risks: knowledge leaks and opportunism. 
Conversely, franchisees may become overly dependent on franchisors as the 
providers of all operation-related products and technologies. This problem, 
combined with the high transaction costs involved, prevents franchisees from 
conducting successful operations when their franchisors stop supplying necessary 
products and technologies, and furthermore impedes franchisee evolution. 
 
3. Methods 
This study reviewed research on franchise systems conducted in Taiwan to gain 
insight into the current state of this area of study. Airiti Library was chosen as the 
study database and Academic Citation Index (ACI) was selected as the citation 
index. Relevant studies published in Taiwan before June 30, 2016 were found 
using “joining a franchise system” and “franchis*” (e.g., franchise, franchising, 
franchisor, and franchisee) as the keywords. On the basis of the theme of this 
study, the inclusion criterion selected was studies on franchise systems and the 
exclusion criteria chosen were (1) national organizations or alliances, (2) 
professional baseball franchises, (3) equal franchises, (4) business groups or 
alliances, (5) authorized or commissioned operations, (6) cable television 
franchises, (7) alliances, (8) franchise value hypotheses, and (9) studies unrelated 
to franchise systems. A total of 47 studies were collected, 16 of which were 
published by the TSSCI. This study primarily analyzed studies published by the 
TSSCI, and the search and screening process is described as follows (Fig. 1): 
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Figure 1. Search and screening process for studies related to franchise systems 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Classification of study methods 
An analysis of relevant papers published by the TSSCI showed that the most 
common types of studies that have been conducted by Taiwanese researchers 
arequantitative research (56.25%), case studies (25.0%), conceptual papers 
(12.5%), and qualitative research (6.25%). Studies that involved statistical analyses 
were mostly quantitative research, indicating that it is the dominant method and 
that researchers generally use quantified data to perform statistical analyses. Case 
studies involve in-depth, systematic qualitative analyses and may include 
quantitative data (Peng, et al., 2010). Because case studies have a wealth of 
information, are diversified, and enable readers to discover the implications 
ofphenomena described by the studies, they have become increasingly popular in 
recent years. Although conceptual papers only accounted for a relatively low 
percentage, they remain highly important because conceptual clarifications are a 
critical aspect of research related to franchise systems. Despite qualitative research 
only accounting for 6.25% of studies, the method was not overlooked by 
researchers. In fact, of the case studies obtained in this study, 100% employed the 
qualitative research method, and 25%used both the qualitative and quantitative 
research methods. This indicates that the qualitative design is the most commonly 
used research method in case studies to help researchers better understand the 
nature of case studies in this field. Details on research methods related to franchise 
systems are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Research Methods Related to Franchise Systems 
 Number 
of studies 
Qualitative 
research (%) 
Quantitative 
research (%) 
Case studies 
(%) 
Conceptual 
papers (%) 
Studies published 
by the TSSCI 
16 6.25 56.25 25.0 12.5 
Note: 1.Case studies referred to in this table denote studies that involvedqualitative and/or 
quantitative research in single or multiple cases (Peng, et al., 2010). 
2.Qualitative and quantitative research listed in this table does not include case studies that adopted 
qualitative and quantitative research methods 
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4.2. Classification of study topics 
This studyused the definition of franchise systems proposed by Chiou & Droge 
(2015), in which a franchise system is defined as a hybrid organization built on the 
contractual agreements made between the franchisor and the franchisee. The 
franchisor owns the brand name as well as the product and service-related 
processes, whereas the franchisee pays the franchisor a specified amount of Money 
for the opportunity to operate a small business. The franchisor grants the franchisee 
the rights to use relevant intellectual property and the brand name, and the two 
parties are committed to maximizing franchise profits. Topics covered in relevant 
studies in Taiwan have included entrepreneur traits; motivation for joining (or 
opening) a franchise system; performance; business types; and knowledge, 
technologies, and innovations (Table 2). This study examined the topics of 
franchise system, franchisor, and franchiseeas investigated by researchers in 
previous studies. Accordingly, these topics have been divided into three sections, 
shown as follows. 
 
Table 2. Topics Covered inStudies on Franchise Systems 
Topics Entrepreneur 
traits 
Motivation for 
joining (or opening) 
a franchise system 
Performance Business  
types 
Knowledge, 
technologies 
and 
innovations 
Other 
Franchise 
system 
  [3][10] [10][12][14] [4][8][14] Price adjustment 
[9] 
Franchisor  [7][11][16]   [3] Franchise system 
contract [13] 
Franchisee [1][5][6][15] [5] [1][5]   Development of 
scale [2] 
Note: Numbers in the brackets correspond to the following studies: [1] Lee, Hsu, Chen, & Huang 
(2010); [2] Su (2014); [3] Fang & Wang (2006); [4] Wang & Chen (2016); [5] Tsen & Wu (2011); 
[6] Li (2002); [7] Zhuo, Guo, & Hu (2010); [8] Hou & Lin (1999); [9] Lien & Sheu (2008); [10] Peng 
(2003); [11] You & Chen (2016); [12] Huang & Wang (2005); [13] Yang (2016); [14] Management 
Review Editorial Board (1986); [15] Tsai, Lu, & Zhong (2015); and [16] Wei & Zhang (2015). 
 
4.3. Franchise system 
In essence, franchising involves many small companies joining a contractual 
relationship-based franchise system and subsequently forming a large, hybrid 
organization, in which contractual relationships as well as formal and rigorous 
legal provisions are in place to regulate the conduct of the franchisor and the 
franchisees (Evanschitzky, Caemmerer, & Backhaus, 2016). As a result, franchise 
system-based hybrid organizations exhibit internal and external diversification. A 
franchise system comprises a franchisor and many franchisees, whose most 
important asset is their brand (Minkler & Park, 1994) and ultimate goal is to work 
together to maximize profits (Chiou & Droge, 2015). A review of the literature 
found that topics covered have included performance (12.5%); business types 
(18.75%); knowledge, technologies, and innovations (18.75%); and price 
adjustment (6.25%); among which business types and knowledge, technologies, 
and innovations were the topics that have most interested researchers. 
Of the studies on the subject of franchise systems, two focused on performance; 
one study investigated the use of dual embeddedness (i.e., market and system) to 
facilitate knowledge creation and improve performance (Fang & Wang, 2006), 
whereas the other study comparedthe effect of business type on performance in the 
real estate intermediary industry. For the latter study, the results showed that outlet 
stores outperformed franchise and nonoutlet stores (Peng, 2003). From a strategic 
management perspective, franchise store shave operating costs lower than those 
ofoutlet stores, enabling faster expansion. However, qualitymay differ significantly 
between franchise stores, potentially creating problems. For example, when many 
franchisees are recruited, the poor performance of one franchisee will jeopardize 
the overall image of the franchise system, hindering performance and sustainable 
operations. The constant creation of knowledge and accumulation of organizational 
knowledge are prerequisites for gaining a competitive advantage (Fang &Wang, 
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2006), and knowledge sharing, trust, conflict management, and brand reputation 
are key factors affecting franchise system performance (Wu, 2015). These concepts 
may serve as a reference for future researchers when conducting related studies. 
Furthermore, three studies on franchise systems delved into business types; one 
examined the effect of business type on performance in the real estate industry 
(Peng, 2003), one studied the business models of the refurbishment industry 
(Huang & Wang, 2005), and one explored business types and new product 
developments (Management Review Editorial Board, 1986). The studies mainly 
compared the pros and cons of the different business types and the effect of 
business type on performance, with the results indicating that outlet stores have the 
optimal business model; various business model shave their advantages and 
disadvantages; and outlet stores face several markedly difficult challenges such as 
high capital, high risk, high operating costs, and low expansion speed (Peng, 2003; 
Huang & Wang, 2005; Management Review Editorial Board, 1986). However, 
these challenges may be overcome through the adoption of the hybrid 
organizational model of franchise systems. 
Three more of the studies analyzed knowledge, technologies, and innovations; 
one researched service innovation (Wang & Chen, 2016), one investigated new 
product development (Management Review Editorial Board, 1986) (both adopted 
case study methods), and one inspected the effect of information technology on 
franchise systems (Hou & Lin, 1999). One other related study covered the topic of 
price adjustment (Lien & Sheu, 2008), exploring the effects of the simultaneous 
price adjustment of gasoline products on franchise systems. 
In summary, the eight franchise system-related studies (repeated studies were 
removed), mostly focused on how to achieve optimal performance; the pros and 
cons of different business types; knowledge, technologies, and innovations; and 
price adjustment. 
 
4.4. Franchisors 
In a franchise system, the franchisor has the power to control the entire hybrid 
organization. Because the franchisor owns the products, service processes, and 
brand name (Chiou & Droge, 2015) and grants franchisees relatively limited rights 
and resources (Burton, Cross, & Rhodes, 2000), it enjoys absolute dominance. 
Of the studies on the subject of franchisors, five covered motivations for joining 
franchise systems (Zhuo, Guo, & Hu, 2010; You & Chen, 2016; Wei & Zhang, 
2015); knowledge, technologies, and innovations (Fang & Wang, 2006); and 
franchise system contracts (Yang, 2016). Three studies investigated franchisors’ 
motivations for opening franchise systems (primarily emphasizing the time when 
franchisors opened franchise systems and how franchises were to be managed and 
controlled when there were numerous ones in a region). Among these, You & Chen 
(2016) adopted a case study method to discuss brand insistence and fast expansion; 
Fang & Wang (2006) delved into the use of market embeddedness and system 
embeddedness by franchise systems to facilitate knowledge creation andimprove 
organizational performance; and Yang (2016) argued that franchisors have the 
obligation to disclose contract information because they hold more information 
than franchisees, and discussed the responsible parties and compensation to be paid 
in the event of a breach of contract. 
In summary, domestic studies on the subject of franchisors have mainly focused 
on franchisors’ motivations for opening franchise systems. Future studies may 
explore other topics such as organizational structure, knowledge management, 
resource allocation, and information asymmetry. 
 
4.5. Franchisees 
In a franchise system, the franchisee pays the franchisor a specified amount of 
Money for the opportunity to operate a small business. The franchisor grants the 
franchisee the rights to use relevant intellectual property and the brand name 
(Chiou & Droge, 2015). Of the studies on the subject of franchisees, five covered 
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the topics of entrepreneur traits (Lee, et al., 2010; Tsen & Wu, 2011; Lee, 2002; 
Tsai, Lu, & Zhong, 2015), motivation for joining a franchise system (Tsen & Wu, 
2011), performance (Lee, et al., 2010; Tsen & Wu, 2011), and development of 
scale (Su, 2014). 
 
4.6. Theoretical perspectives 
A literature review showed that most researchers conducted theory-based 
studies (Table 3). These involved agency (22.22%), resource scarcity (16.67%), 
information asymmetry (11.11%), transaction cost (11.11%), intellectual capital 
(5.56%), resource dependence (5.56%), dynamic knowledge creation (5.56%), 
resource constraint (5.56%), social identity (5.56%), risk allocation (5.56%), and 
intellectual capital (5.56%) theories. Of these, the most commonly referenced were 
agency, resource scarcity, information asymmetry, and transaction cost theories, 
which are explained as follows. 
 
Table 3. Theories Used inStudies on Franchise Systems 
Name of theories Number of studies Ratio (%) 
Agency theory 4 22.22% 
Resource scarcity theory 3 16.67% 
Information asymmetry theory 2 11.11% 
Transaction cost theory 2 11.11% 
Intellectual capital theory 1 5.56% 
Resource dependence theory 1 5.56% 
Dynamic knowledge creation theory 1 5.56% 
Resource constraint theory 1 5.56% 
Social identity theory 1 5.56% 
Risk allocation theory 1 5.56% 
Intellectual capital theory 1 5.56% 
Note: some studies used multiple theories 
 
4.7. Agency theory 
Agency theory posits that when a franchisor ventures into a distant or 
unfamiliar market, opening a franchise system that local franchisees can join will 
reduce costs. Failure to do so will increase costs. Therefore, agency theory predicts 
that when a franchisor ventures into such a market, the franchisor will become 
more dependent on the franchise system than they would be otherwise 
(Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006a). Implementation of a franchise system 
can minimize agency costs and strikes the optimal balance between rewards for 
factory outlet managers and company goals. The agent relationship consists of a 
client (i.e.,the franchisor) and an agent (i.e., the franchisee), in which the first party 
(i.e., the client) gives authorization to the second party (i.e., the agent) to operate. 
Assuming that each party acts in self-interest and has independent goals, the client 
uses resources to ensure that the choice of hiring an agent yields the optimal result 
(Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006b). 
 
4.8. Resource scarcity theory 
Resource scarcity theory postulates that in the early stage of a business, 
companies are small and lack management experience. Therefore, they have 
difficulty obtaining funds from traditional financial markets. To drive rapid growth, 
the company may open a franchise system, in which funds collected from 
franchisees can be usedas internally generated resources to achieve economies of 
scale (Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006b). As the franchise system grows, it 
generates capital and develops management abilities. In addition, because internal 
resources are sufficient to compensate for the profits that can be generated from 
expansion, the franchisor will no longer rely on franchisees and may utilize internal 
resources to purchase back the franchisees to generate more profits 
(Castrogiovanni, Combs, & Justis, 2006a). 
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4.9. Information asymmetry theory 
Franchise systems are exposed to the problem of information asymmetry, in 
which franchisors have more internal information than franchisees do. This makes 
it easy for franchisors to seek private gains at the cost of franchisees. The fact that 
the franchisors know more will raise franchisees’ suspicions, accelerating franchise 
system collapse. Therefore, the ability to manage information asymmetry in a 
franchise systemis of great importance; it reduces the risks of moral hazard 
(Puciato, & Mrozowicz, 2013) and increases organizational stability. Therefore, 
when franchisees join, franchisors and franchisees must establish a trust 
relationship and relationship norms through mutual communication. In addition, 
the two parties must sign a formal and binding contract (Gassenheimer, Baucus, & 
Baucus, 1996) to minimize information asymmetry and prevent franchise system 
collapse. The research reviewed in the present study revealed that prior to the 
signing of affiliate agreements, franchisors are in an absolutely dominant position 
and thus have the obligation to disclose relevant information (e.g., Yang, 2016). In 
addition, the examined studies have investigated workplace ethics from the 
perspective of information asymmetry (Lee, 2002). 
 
4.10. Transaction cost theory 
Transaction cost theory originated from Coase’s idea of transaction cost 
economy (1937). The theory operates on the basic assumptions ofbounded 
rationality and opportunism. Coase argued that the choice betweenmarket and 
hierarchy governance structures is primarily determined by the transaction costs 
involved. However, direct measurement of transaction costsis difficult and thus 
rarely cited (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006).  
In 1975, Williamson continued to study transaction cost theory and divided it 
into ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs (Williamson, 1985, p.20). The theory 
subsequently underwent numerous revisions and expansions and has become a 
novel theory with many empirical developments (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 
2006). 
Franchising is a crucial strategy for reducing transaction costs and is an 
excellent example of an alliance. Because transaction costs are easily generated 
during internal and external coordination activities such as negotiations, 
supervisions, and economic exchanges, franchises employ their unique governance 
models (Stanworth, & Curran, 1991) to reduce the chances of opportunism (which 
jeopardize the entire organization) and facilitate effective resource distribution 
(Spinelli, & Birley, 1996). In addition, because franchisorsare easily influenced by 
opportunism, when franchise performance shows stagnant or negative growth, 
franchisors will have no incentive to comply with their obligations. This leads to 
franchisees leavingthe system and discourages potential franchisees from joining it 
(Chen, & Dimou, 2005). Similarly, franchisees’ opportunistic behavior will also 
increase the franchisors’ transaction costs (i.e., bargaining, supervision, and 
adaptation costs). However, cooperation between the two parties will reduce 
bargaining costs, and formalized (standardized)control structures will reduce 
opportunistic behavior (Dahlstrom, & Nygaard, 1999). Chen & Dimou (2005) 
indicated that international hotel groups who recruit franchisees are exposed to two 
risks, namely knowledge leaks and opportunism. Organizational governance 
structures generally use long-term contracts to diminish bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1985). However, despite franchise contracts being able to effectively 
prevent monopolies and resolve bounded rationality, they may also increase 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1976). Thus, franchisors and franchisees must 
consider these contracts in tandem (Solis-Rodriguez, & Gonzalez-Diaz, 2012; 
Sashi, & Karuppur, 2002). In a global franchise system, contract provisions are 
usually established to prevent unexpected events led by bounded rationality from 
occurring (Sashi, & Karuppur, 2002). This endeavor is an example of how 
transaction cost theory is applied to franchise systems (Contractor, & Kundu, 
1998). In summary, this study argued that the transaction cost theory can be used to 
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explain the bounded rationality, opportunism, and phenomena that occur in 
franchise systems. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Franchise systems have contributed greatly to the development of the 
Taiwanese economy and have become one of the main governance structures used 
by new businesses in Taiwan. This paper analyzed the current developmental state 
of research on franchise systems in Taiwan, and the results may serve as a 
reference for scholars in their future research. 
Study limitations 
Franchise systems are a unique, hybrid form of organization that is subject to 
almost all types of phenomena that can occur in organizations. Therefore, it is 
insufficient to study only entrepreneur traits; motivations for joining (or opening) a 
franchise system; performance; business types; and knowledge, technologies, and 
innovations. In addition to enriching the wealth of data on the aforementioned 
subjects, future researchers may investigate other topics related to franchise 
systems. Because this study only examined studies published by TSSCI, it failed to 
include those conducted in Taiwan but published by international journals. 
Accordingly, studies published by SSCI may be included in future research to gain 
clearer insight into topics related to franchise systems. 
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